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One of the greatest challenges toTurkey’s foreign policy in thepost-Iraq War era concerns thechanging dynamics of Turkey-
EU relations. In analyzing them, one needs
to take into consideration that the dynamics
of Turkey-U.S. and U.S.-EU relations
have also been exposed to significant
challenges in the aftermath of the war.
First, from now on, Turkey’s relevance to
the United States will be dependent less on
Turkey’s military capabilities and
geostrategic location, as used to be the
case, and more on its identity. If the
Americans were seriously committed to
nation-building in predominantly Muslim
societies, particularly those possessing the
potential to nurture global terrorism, then
Turkey’s ideational and civilizational
position would matter a lot. The true
inclusion of a predominantly Muslim
country in the community of developed
liberal-democratic states would certainly
strengthen the soft power of the United
States in its fight against global terror.
However, the degree of Turkey’s attrac-
tiveness for American policy would in-
crease if Turkey could solve its external
and internal (mainly radical Islamist and
separatist Kurdish movements) security
problems through domestic pluralization
and liberalization and thus reach a more
stable relationship with the European
Union. Such a Turkey would not only feel
more self-confident but less burdened by
its unbalanced relations with the United
States. Second, it seems that there is now
a serious crisis of confidence between the
parties, mainly stemming from their diver-
gent security interests. Third, the gradual
drifting apart of the United States and the
European Union in terms of their geopoliti-
cal priorities and assessment of security
threats1  will likely affect the tone of
Turkey’s relations with Europe. The
important questions are how the EU
Defense and Security Policy will evolve
and how it will relate to NATO’s own
transformation. The greater the conver-
gence of these two processes and the
more the United States and the EU view
threats to their national security in similar
terms, the easier it will be for Turkey to
cooperate with the West. Turkey might find
it difficult to synchronize its policies
towards the EU and the United States,
particularly if Turkey is exposed to diverg-
ing demands from each.
For example, Turkey’s room for
maneuver in northern Iraq will be seriously
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constrained by possible U.S. and EU
concerns. The United States would not
want Turkey to have a clear mandate to
undertake security operations, for this
would likely pit Turkey against the new
regime in Baghdad as well as the pro-
American Kurdish groups in the north.
Turkey would also be constrained by the
European Union, which might ask Ankara
to synchronize its foreign-policy prefer-
ences and strategies with those of the EU
in order to join the union.2 Turkey will be
increasingly exposed to European calls to
cope with its security problems through
“politicization” and “de-securitization.”3
TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
A related factor in this regard would
concern Turkey’s increasing need to
become a part of the European Union in the
face of strained relations with the United
States. A simultaneous process of estrange-
ment from both the EU and the United
States would radically militate against
Turkey’s ability to shape developments in
the region. What is significant in this regard
concerns the fact that the legitimacy of the
Europeanization efforts of the Justice and
Development party since its accession to
power in late 2002 has increased according
to public-opinion surveys, due to the fact
that the allegedly pro-American forces in
Turkey, mainly the army, did not play
constructive roles in the management of
bilateral relations on the eve of the Iraqi
crisis. That Turkish-American relations
have soured over Iraq is seen by quite a
number of people in Turkey as the failure of
the army to sincerely support the
government’s policies.4
Turkey’s need to become further
integrated into the EU seems to have
increased since the Iraq war. For one thing,
Turkey would eventually be able to assess
the EU’s commitment towards its member-
ship only in this way. Unless Turkey met
the accession criteria first, it would be a
fruitless discussion whether the EU is
biased towards Turkey’s membership.
In addition, Turkey can cope with the
security challenges and risks of globaliza-
tion in the most effective and efficient way
by integrating with the global community
through the EU accession process.5 To
prevent dismemberment through globaliza-
tion (the most important security threat
Turkey faces), the safest strategy for
Turkey is to evolve into a liberal-pluralistic
society as part of the integration process
with the EU. Europeanization as a global-
ization strategy would be regarded in
Turkey as legitimate, for this process would
also bring Turkey closer to its Western/
European identity. Second, Turkey would
become more able to deal with the frag-
menting effects of globalization, simply
because the EU accession process has
never resulted in the dismemberment of
any country aspiring to join the Union. If it
is sure that the concept of security would
be rewritten in such a way that threats to
individual and societal needs are far more
important than the threats to sovereignty
and territorial integrity of nation-states,
Turkey can better transform its security
understanding by trying to meet the EU’s
accession criteria, for the EU’s conception
of security clearly shapes these criteria.
Third, Turkey would hardly be able to
integrate with the global economy without
remaining in the EU accession process. It
is quite likely that foreign investors will not
come to Turkey unless Turkey gets stabi-
lized and gives the impression that it
belongs to the Western world. The shortest
and soundest way to realize this is through
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Turkey’s march to Brussels.6
Fourth, democratization within the
context of the EU accession process is the
best route for a country such as Turkey.
Democratization within the Europeanization
process offers the most important incen-
tives for both external and domestic actors
to undertake reforms. Fifth, Turkey would
also increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis
the United States by increasing the quality
of its relations with the European Union.
Given that the degree of U.S.-Turkey
interdependency is highly skewed in favor
of the United States, a weak and non-
Europeanizing Turkey would not be able to
stand up to American demands. The more
balanced interdependent EU-Turkey
relations would serve Turkey’s interests
better.7 The only way for Turkey to
develop a healthy and equal relationship
with the United States is through Turkey’s
membership in the EU. For this to happen
Turkey has to become more Europeanized
and adopt the EU’s more non-realpolitik
security identity. Otherwise Turkey’s
dependency on the United States would be
increased, and Washington would likely
find dealing with Turkey more difficult.
If Turkey is to increase both its hard
and soft power in the age of war against
global terrorism, membership in the EU
would help. For the Turkish model to be
attractive to other Turkic and Muslim
states, Turkey’s modernization process
should successfully pass through the stage
of liberal-pluralistic democracy practiced
within the EU. Any kind of bridge role for
Turkey between the Muslim East and the
Christian West would be unsustainable;
Turkey’s ambiguous identity status would
neither free the country of further risks of
global terrorist attacks nor move the
Europeans to wholeheartedly promote its
membership. For Turkey’s secular democ-
racy to be attractive to others, it needs to
be reconstituted.8
The strange, and fortunate, thing is that
the need of the EU to seek a better and
firmer relationship with Turkey has also
increased in this new era. It has become
clear that the European Union cannot be a
significant security actor in the region
without the membership of a Europeanized
Turkey.9 The current dynamics of global
and regional geopolitics would dictate a
concerted European commitment first to
Turkey’s transformation along the lines of
the EU’s security culture and then its full
membership in the EU. It would be a great
mistake on the part of the EU to hope that
Turkey would continue to cooperate with
the EU on security issues, particularly in
the Greater Middle Eastern region, even if
the EU did not radically change its old
“constructively managed deliberate ambi-
guity” policy towards Turkey. The latest
Cyprus crisis has clearly demonstrated this.
Turkey has hesitated to cooperate with the
EU regarding the EU membership of
Cyprus as an undivided island before
feeling confident of the EU’s commitment
to its own membership.10
There are reasons for the European
Union to upgrade the level of its relations
with Turkey now. First, if the EU wants to
see its security interests preserved and its
security model applied to the global struggle
with terrorism, then Turkey’s incorporation
into the EU family is highly significant.
Given that the sources of global terrorism
mainly originate from the Middle East,
Turkey’s inclusion within the EU would
enable the latter to rely on Turkey’s ad-
vanced military capabilities in its struggle
against such threats. Second, Turkey’s
membership in the EU would bolster the
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claims of those who argue that the war on
terrorism should not be continued on the
basis of a clash of civilizations between the
developed Christian North and the underde-
veloped Muslim South.11 Moreover,
Turkey’s EU membership would also imply
that it is not predestined for a country
whose population is overwhelmingly Mus-
lim, and whose economic power lags far
behind those of the developed countries, to
be barred from the EU, currently a Chris-
tian club of developed European states.
The November blasts in Istanbul seem
to have once again brought to the attention
of the Europeans the question of Turkey’s
status vis-à-vis the EU. The way the EU
from now on handles Turkey’s membership
process will likely reveal one of two things.
The EU might decide to deal with the
global terrorist threat emanating from al-
Qaeda and its affiliates by trying to keep its
distance from the Muslim world and the
so-called zone of danger in the Middle East
through the exclusion of Turkey from the
EU’s zone of peace. Under this scenario,
the EU will continue to see Turkey as a
barrier against the global threats of terror-
ism and WMD. In this scenario, the EU
would also assume that if it disengages
from the global security environment and
does not participate in the U.S.-led war on
terror, then it will be more secure. But the
EU might see Turkey’s membership as a
great asset in terms of the success of its
own model of security management in both
Europe and the global arena. The inclusion
of Turkey would vindicate the fundamental
norms of the European Union that interna-
tional terrorists would like to tarnish. The
EU’s multicultural and post-nationalist
framework might serve as a better formula
for the civilizational conflicts likely to
emanate from the clash of the “West and
the Rest.” Turkey’s accession process
offers the Europeans a real chance to
solve this dilemma once and for all.12
Thought of this way, leaving Turkey outside
the EU and treating it as a buffer against
both soft and hard security threats will not
work anymore. Security issues in this part
of the world have become globalized.
It seems that there is a close relation-
ship between Turkey’s EU accession
process and the EU’s security perception.
The further Turkey’s domestic structuring
departs from that of the EU, the more
turbulence and chaos will probably occur
inside the country. The more internal
instability roils Turkey, the less secure the
EU will likely feel because the kinds of
security threats the EU is trying to elimi-
nate would abound. If mass migration,
domestic instability, the flow of refugees to
Europe and the possibility of civil wars are
referred to by Europeans as among the
future threats to EU security, then it would
be an irrational act on the part of EU
members to stir up the domestic order in
Turkey. The EU would be confronted with
grave security risks whose scope and
impact would be felt much more profoundly
than were the wars in the territories of the
former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. In
the short run, Turkey’s ongoing transforma-
tion process toward EU accession serves
EU security interests by strengthening
directly Turkey’s and indirectly the EU’s
soft security identities. In the long run,
Turkey’s accession to the EU will help the
latter realize both its hard and soft security
interests. Turkey’s membership would
accelerate the transformation of the EU
into a global security actor endowed with
the capability to define the security param-
eters in the Greater Middle East.
If the transatlantic rift between the EU
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and the United States further widens13 in
the years to come, Turkey’s significance
vis-à-vis the European Union will grow.
The membership of a Europeanized Turkey
would help the EU face the United States
in a more confident manner around the
globe. After all, what would be at stake is
the promise of the EU’s security model. If
Turkey were included in the U.S. model, it
would be more difficult for EU members
both to sustain their model of security in
Europe and to transfer it to the periphery
of the continent. In the long run, this would
contribute to the erosion of the EU’s sense
of security. On the other hand, if EU
members increasingly believe that partner-
ship with the United States would prove
more beneficial for the EU than rivalry, the
membership of a Europeanized Turkey
would also hold more advantages than
disadvantages. By incorporating such a
Turkey into its midst, the EU countries
would give the United States the signal that
the EU is contributing to the stabilization of
the continent and is willing to help the U.S.
concentrate its energy on other problematic
areas of the globe, such as  Central and
East Asia. In fact, this is the prevailing
logic behind the American efforts to
support Turkey’s accession to the Union.14
All in all, in this new era, it is going to
be more difficult for Turkey to formulate
and implement foreign policies independent
of the dynamics of its relations with the
EU. How would Turkey dare to disregard
the organizing and constitutive principles of
EU foreign, defense and security policies
on the one hand and the main geopolitical
interests of the major EU members on the
other, while aspiring to join the EU?
Turkey’s non-EU-oriented foreign policy
will gradually become an impossibility as its
external and internal security interests
remain to a great extent dependent on how
the EU accession process unfolds.15
A recent example of the impact of the
EU on Turkey’s foreign and security
policies involved the question of Cyprus’s
EU membership. The Justice and Develop-
ment party has openly disputed well-
established Turkish foreign-policy practices
over the Cyprus dispute. While the govern-
ment has seen the EU membership pros-
pects of Cyprus as a significant opportunity
before both the solution of the dispute and
Turkey’s own EU membership process, the
elites have interpreted the Europeanization
of the Turkish-Greek disputes in general
and the Cyprus dispute in particular as
well-articulated Greek and European
machinations against Turkey.16 To them,
the Cyprus dispute would constitute a good
excuse for the Europeans to permanently
delay Turkey’s accession to the EU.
It is within this context that the govern-
ment has tended to interpret the EU’s
latest strategy paper, issued in November
2003, in a positive manner. They appear to
believe that the real reason the EU has
seen the non-resolution of the Cyprus
dispute as a great obstacle to setting a
clear date for the start of Turkey’s acces-
sion talks relates to the fact that EU
bureaucrats are realistic about the possible
hardships that both Greek Cypriots and
Greeks might create. To government
circles, the EU Commission is trying to
convince a skeptical European public
opinion of the appropriateness of Turkey’s
membership by working for the emergence
of positive images of Turkey. To them, if
the Cyprus dispute gets resolved by
Turkey’s constructive attitude, which they
hope will take place as part of Turkey’s
accession process, then Turkey’s image in
Europe would greatly improve.
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NEW SECURITY UNDERSTANDING
Just as it is gradually becoming a
necessity on the part of the European
Union to offer Turkey more credible
membership prospects in order to ensure
cooperation on issues of security, the
Turkish political-military elites have also
started to internalize the idea that if Turkey
wants to feel secure it needs, first of all, to
put its house in order along the lines of
pluralist-liberalism, as articulated within the
EU. In view of today’s diffuse global
threats to security, the elites have started to
argue more openly for a redefinition of
Turkey’s security understanding. For
Turkey to feel exempt from the dangers
that might come from outside its borders,
particularly Iraq, a reorganization and
restructuring of domestic politics, as well
as state-society relations, should be under-
taken. What is interesting in this regard is
the emergence of two particular groups in
Turkey, each with diverging assumptions
and blueprints in regard to EU-Turkey
relations. Their definitions of Turkey’s
security ends and means will to an impor-
tant degree be linked to how they concep-
tualize Turkey’s relations with the EU.17
While the Euro-sceptics argue that
Turkey’s EU accession process threatens
Turkey’s security, or at least the main
premises of the Kemalist security under-
standing, the pro-EU circles argue for
further integration because this would be
the only way to achieve security.
The post-Iraq war era has made it once
again clear that Turkey’s external and
domestic politics are becoming increasingly
intertwined. Just as the political status of
the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq will
have an impact on Turkey’s policies to-
wards its own Kurds, the way Turkey deals
with its Kurdish problem will also affect
Turkey’s attitude towards the Kurds of
northern Iraq. Given that the political status
of Turkey’s Kurdish-origin citizens is an
issue of high concern, if a solution cannot
be found that would satisfy all the parties,
Turkey would likely continue to securitize
the political developments outside its
borders in which the Kurds are involved.18
One significant myth of Turkey’s
foreign policy towards Iraq has been that
Turkey’s national interests in northern Iraq
would be best preserved by the suppression
of the Kurds there and the strengthening of
the Turkoman community to counterbalance
the Kurds. It has been within this context
that Turkey has intermittently tried to
prevent the main Kurdish political groups in
the region, the KDP and the PUK, from
becoming powerful enough to challenge the
territorial integrity of Iraq. The Kurds have
always been seen as potential sources of
instability in the region as well as in Turkey
itself. They have been thought of as master-
minding grandiose plans first to break up
Iraq and establish their own independent
state and then to carve out Turkey’s Kurd-
dominated regions.19 It has been in line with
this spirit that Turkey did not want to let the
Americans open a second front in northern
Iraq in the latest war. The fear was that the
Kurds would take this as an opportunity to
establish their own state.
Turkey’s realities, however, should
have dictated a different logic. The fact
that nearly 10-15 million of Turkey’s
citizens are of Kurdish origin should have
led the Turkish elite to consider the Kurds
of northern Iraq as the relatives of
Turkey’s people. If the Turkoman commu-
nity in Iraq were seen by the Turkish elite
as true relatives, despite their marginal and
disputed numbers, the Kurds should have
quite naturally been seen through the same
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lenses. Their numbers and political status in
the region outweigh those of the
Turkomans. Given that the Kurds are also
seen through sympathetic eyes in the
Western international community, Turkey
should have promoted closer relations with
the Kurds as much as possible.
The failure of Turkey to establish
cordial and cooperative relations with the
Kurds of northern Iraq, as well as with its
own Kurdish population, will likely engen-
der unsavory outcomes in the years ahead.
Now, while the Kurds are treated as the
staunchest allies of the Americans in the
region, Turkey is being denied any influen-
tial role in the reconstruction of Iraq.
CONCLUSIONS
Before putting any realistic course of
action in front of Turkey’s current and
future leaders, it should be underscored
that the three characteristic premises of
Turkey’s security culture are no longer
valid in today’s global and regional environ-
ment. There is no unified West today, nor
does the geopolitical and geostrategic
significance of Turkey remain unques-
tioned. Nor can the optimum level of
security be achieved by putting the state
before the society as the most significant
security referent. The practices of exclu-
sion, suppression and military force are no
longer the ideal means for dealing with
today’s security threats.
If the Turkish political and state elites
seriously want Turkey to feel secure in the
years ahead, particularly from threats
outside of the Middle East and from the
dynamics of bilateral relations with the
United States and the European Union,
they should explore how to conceptualize
Turkey’s security threats and how to cope
with them. Being aware of the close
relationship between foreign and domestic
developments, they should soon come to a
collective understanding that Turkey will no
longer be able to define its security on the
basis of state sovereignty and territorial
integrity. If societal needs are not met, the
state as an entity will always be exposed to
challenges from various domestic groups,
be they Kurds or political Islamists.
The ongoing accession process with
the EU would contribute to Turkey’s sense
of security through the transformation of
Turkey’s structural conditions in line with
the European Union. A Turkey that has
finally reached satisfying state-society
relations and become more Europeanized
through the EU accession process will
become more able to stand as a significant
country in its region, with a recognized
ability to determine the dynamics of
regional politics. If Turkey oscillates
between becoming more Europeanized and
turning inward, not only will its ability to
stand up to European and American
demands gradually wane but Turkey will
not be able to develop healthy cooperative
relations with the United States.
Turkey will preserve its influential
position in the region only if the Turkish
elite both successfully restructures
Turkey’s state-society relations along
European models and cooperates with,
rather than challenges, the United States.
The worst outcome for Turkey would
be for its prospects for EU membership to
falter because of its domestic performance
in the EU-oriented reformation process,
while the quality of US-Turkey strategic
relations also declined. In such a case,
Turkey’s marginalization in the region would
likely increase and the internal political
arena would be dominated by continuous
struggle between the EU-oriented JDP and
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the nationalist-secularist establishment.
Under such conditions, Turkey might fall
into internal chaos, its hopes for develop-
ment and Europeanization seriously dashed.
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